Harvey Siegel on Epistemology and Education: Rationality, Normativity and Justification by MISAWA, Koichiro & 三澤, 紘一郎
19 19
Harvey Siegel on Epistemology and Education:  
Rationality, Normativity and Justification
Koichiro MISAWA
School of Social Welfare, Tokyo University of Social Welfare (Isesaki Campus),
2020-1 San’o-cho, Isesaki-city, Gunma 372-0831, Japan
(Received June 1, 2015; Accepted September 10, 2015)
Abstract: This paper attempts to elicit an intertwined relation between philosophy and education by revolving the 
discussion around three constituents of human knowledge: rationality, normativity and justification.  This exploration 
takes the form of a close critique of Harvey Siegel’s work.  Siegel’s analytical-philosophy-inspired defence of traditional 
epistemology and accordingly his preferred views on education are, to some extent, successful in construing an essential 
relation between philosophy and education.  Yet, this paper argues that his approach does not overcome the philosophical 
cul-de-sac of how to reconcile the epistemic capacity of rational justification with the non-epistemic character of truth. 
It is then claimed that, in order to move beyond the predicament, we need to reconfigure the components of what it is 
for humans to know.  The paper draws on Martin Heidegger’s distinction between earth and world as well as ―more 
substantially― on Hilary Putnam’s recent idea of the interpenetration between value judgements, descriptions of fact and 
human linguistic conventions.  The watershed that divides Siegel’s defence of traditional epistemology and this paper’s 
argument is a sensitivity towards what might be called the social and historical aspects of human knowledge.
(Reprint request should be sent to Koichiro Misawa)
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[A]s epistemology waxed in the world of general philos-
ophy, it waned in the philosophy of education community.
Harvey Siegel (2008)
1.  Elusive ties between philosophy and education?
Both education and philosophy, however defined respec-
tively, are concerned with knowledge.  Despite this obvious 
affinity regarding knowledge, their relative lack of interaction 
seems to be widely felt.  This meagre relation appears to 
corroborate the existence of a fragmentary development 
in the institutionalised and compartmentalised academic 
disciplines of ‘Philosophy’ and ‘Education’ in general as 
well as ‘epistemology’ (or the theory of knowledge) and 
‘the philosophy of education’ in particular.1  What I set out 
to do in this paper is to draw more attention to the funda-
mental interrelation between philosophy and education 
—one whose relative lack of emphasis weakens the best 
practice and understanding of both.
One crucial trigger causing the discrepancy between 
general philosophy and the philosophy of education 
vis-à-vis questions of epistemology could be ascribed to 
an ever increasing ramification of complicated theories in 
academic philosophy.2  This tendency has been prompted 
by the turbulence facing traditional epistemology since 
the previous century, caused by, say, ‘Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism’ (Quine, 1951) and ‘Is Justified True Belief 
Knowledge?’ (Gettier, 1963).3  Sceptical worries about 
traditional epistemology has brought to light ‘the psycho-
logical sub-processes’, which ‘causally generate states of 
belief’ in the analysis of knowledge beyond ‘the logical 
relations among propositions believed by the subject’ 
(Kitcher, 1992).  This line of argument is often called 
naturalistic― in particular, psychologistic―epistemology. 
The strong version of naturalised epistemology―especially, 
Quine’s sort― ‘leaves aside questions of justification and 
considers only the genetic, causal question’ (Dancy, 1985, 
italics added).
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It may be no surprise that, in the eyes of many philoso-
phers of education, such detailed complication of theories 
is of only marginal relevance to what the philosophy of 
education is―or should be—concerned with.  Notwith-
standing this seemingly understandable outlook about the 
weak relation between philosophy and education, recent 
philosophical scholarship, in my view, shows a much clos-
er alliance of philosophy with education.  To make a case 
for this thesis, I will cast some light on three ingredients of 
human knowledge that are key to understanding what it 
is for human beings to know something at all: rationality, 
normativity and justification.
This attempt will be made by developing a critique of the 
work of Harvey Siegel who is a leading American 
epistemologist (of education).  There are three reasons for 
this.  First, he frequently refers to those notions in question 
in a limited, though rigorously analytical, style.  Second, 
his vigorous defence of ‘traditional, “conservative,” 
Enlightenment epistemology’ (Siegel, 1997) serves as a 
touchstone as to how far what I provisionally dub the social 
and historical dimensions of human knowledge require a 
departure from a traditional epistemology.  Third, he casts 
doubt on two currently prevailing views in philosophy: 
(neo-) pragmatism, which presently enjoys popularity 
(particularly in the U.S.) and the later Wittgenstein’s view, 
which is also highly acknowledged (especially in the U.K.).4
There is no doubt that Siegel’s formulation of the affinity 
between epistemology and education is rigorously analytical 
and watertight.  The basic thrust of his argument is that 
the Enlightenment standards of rationality hold universally 
and thus fostering the rational ability is one crucial aim of 
education across societies and epochs.  This view has some 
truth in it, but it is restrictive to the extent that the discourse 
appears to simplify the issue of rationality and reason by 
disregarding the social and historical conditions that have 
placed them where they are.  Here I am not at all committed 
to asserting social ‘constructionist’ ideas of the untenable 
kinds (In this respect, I find myself in substantial agree-
ment with Siegel as to the dubious status of anti-realist 
theories).  Rather my dissatisfaction with Siegel’s thought 
largely derives from his inadequate account of rational justi-
fication and truth, which seems to make him blind to the 
essentially educational nature of human knowledge.  To 
clarify the issue, in what follows, I (i) begin by articulating 
why Siegel’s account of rational justification and truth is 
unsatisfying by comparison with Martin Heidegger’s and 
Charles Taylor’s line of thought and then (ii) pay heed to 
recent developments in Hilary Putnam’s ideas to encourage 
further reflection on what it is for humans to know some-
thing. Through these considerations, I (iii) offer an inter-
woven relation between philosophy and education in the 
light of human knowledge.
2.  The engaged intellect: Heidegger-Taylor
I begin with Siegel’s reaction against Charles Taylor’s 
challenge to the assumptions of traditional epistemology. 
Taylor’s challenge is ‘to views of knowledge which regard 
it as representing an independent reality, and which do not 
recognize that knowers are agents’ (Siegel, 1998).  In his 
‘Overcoming Epistemology’, Taylor claims that the whole 
enterprise of modern representational epistemology bound 
up with the faith in foundationalism—on the grounds of the 
‘disengaged subject’ and atomism—should come to an end. 
Drawing on Heidegger’s notion of ‘being-in-the-world’—
put crudely, the idea that ‘we are not disengaged subjects, 
but agents, and that our knowledge depends upon this fact’ 
(Siegel, 1998, italics in original)—, Taylor insists that:
The notion that our understanding of the world is grounded 
in our dealings with it is equivalent to the thesis that this 
understanding is not ultimately based on representations 
at all, in the sense of depictions that are separately iden-
tifiable from what they are of  (Taylor, 1995, p12, italics 
added).
At the heart of this sentence lies the rejection of the 
so-called representationalist theory or, put otherwise, 
correspondence theory of truth.  Today criticism of the 
conventionally accepted dichotomy between the knowing 
subject and the known object is widely recognised in 
philosophy.  One vital result of this line of criticism, in my 
view, is that the lingering philosophical pathology—
especially in the Cartesian and British empiricist tradition—
of how human minds (or thought or concept) can be in touch 
with reality (namely, the non-epistemic physical world) is 
exorcised to a large extent.
Yet, Siegel does not see Taylor’s argument as convincing. 
He argues that: ‘This [Taylor’s argument] in no way under-
mines the view that knowledge consists in beliefs which 
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(among other conditions) accurately portray “an indepen-
dent reality” (Siegel, 1998, p28).  Siegel then feels able to 
incorporate Taylor’s point by eliminating ‘infallible certainty’ 
from the traditional constituents in modern epistemology—
such as abstract rationality, theoretical justification, theoreti-
cal reason, objective knowledge, absolute truth, the a priori, 
conceptual clarification, immediate universality and so on. 
What Siegel advocates is, therefore, traditional epistemology 
with fallibilism—the idea that ‘all claims are fallible and 
open to challenge, and no claims are certain’ (Siegel, 1997, 
p121, italics in original).
It is questionable, however, that Siegel’s argument fully 
reflects Taylor’s point. Siegel, while embracing fallibilism, 
does not admit the necessity of repudiating the traditional 
correspondence theory of truth—i.e. the idea of truth as 
‘radically nonepistemic’ (Siegel, 1997, p216)—, although he 
argues that ‘[c]orrespondence cannot be a criterion of truth, 
for we have no independent access to an independent reality 
and so cannot tell when or whether the criterion is met’ 
(Siegel, 1997, p206, italics in original).  It is a particular form 
of justification that Siegel brings as a means to mediate us 
to truth.  He succinctly writes: ‘Because we lack direct 
access to truth, we have no choice but to approach truth by 
way of justification’ (Siegel, 2005, p352).  Coupled with 
fallibilism, Siegel’s view concerning justification and truth 
then runs as follows: ‘the upshot of rational justification is 
a prima facie case for truth; rational justification is 
a fallible indicator of truth’ (Siegel, 1997, p34, italics in 
original).  His explanation of fallibilism, justification and 
truth is, nonetheless, far from satisfactory to the extent that 
it still tells us little about how rational justification (which 
is epistemic) has necessary connection with truth (which is 
non-epistemic).
Turning to an instance about which Taylor and Siegel 
diverge will illustrate what is at issue.  Taylor claims that 
‘[w]e can draw a neat line between my picture of an object 
and that object, but not between my dealing with the object 
and that object’; on the other hand, Siegel argues that 
‘I can…perfectly well distinguish…between my dealing 
with the keyboard on which I am now typing, and the key-
board’ (Siegel, 1998, p27, italics in original).  Siegel fails, 
in my eyes, to fully comprehend the crucial point that one 
single object, while existing independently of the existence 
of the human knower, cannot be intelligible to humans as 
that object.  That the content of an object makes sense only 
in one’s dealing with the object means that it becomes 
intelligible only when one relates to it by reference to the 
necessarily historically conditioned conceptual content of 
that relationship or engagement.  This also requires us, 
and always already, to know other objects—precisely as a 
condition for knowing that particular object.  For example, 
to understand what a keyboard is, we need to know what 
keyboards look like, what we use them for, and what it is 
like to play one.  Without being acquainted with this sort 
of (latent) historical, practical and relational knowledge of 
what dealing with a keyboard means, Siegel cannot under-
stand it as having an objective meaning. In other words, 
Siegel does not consider the full meaning of ‘dealing with’ 
in Taylor’s terms; that is, Siegel’s account of ‘dealing with’ 
seems merely an action of fingers striking the keys.
Siegel’s view is surely worth attending to as a warning 
against the tendency towards an excessive relativisation 
and subjectivisation of discourse—which is particularly 
rampant in educational research.5  We do not need to regard 
Taylor’s point, however, as tantamount to sheer relativism 
or subjectivism. For human conceptual commitment does 
not necessitate a repudiation of ‘objectivity’ as such.  It is 
futile, therefore, to reduce this fertile philosophical view to 
an all-or-nothing issue by dichotomising possible ways of 
thinking into two kinds: One is the deviation of abstract 
and immediate universalism—i.e. the idea that objective 
truth is absolutely non-epistemic, which is out there once 
and for all; the other deviation is to abandon the notion of 
objectivity altogether by seeing it as merely relative to 
human epistemic differences.
Siegel is right that the world we live in is by no means a 
human epistemic fabrication; yet, he seems to underesti-
mate what might be called a socio-historical account of the 
human mind and knowledge.  That is, we qua humans do 
not live in the inanimate world that is generally assumed as 
the subject matter of natural science, but always already in 
the world that is composed of multiple layers of social 
reality.  For clarification of this thread of thinking which 
avoids Siegel’s formulation that rational justification is 
epistemic whereas truth is non-epistemic, I find helpful 
Heidegger’s (provisional) distinction between the world 
and the earth.
In ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, Heidegger (1993) 
offers a lucid distinction between the world and the earth. 
Although his discussion is complicated and poetically 
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depicted, my purpose here is just to borrow that distinction 
to illustrate my point by slightly interpreting it in my own 
way.  According to that, the world is where we actually live; 
the earth is a meaningless environment that is just there.  In 
the world, there is everything we know: e.g. natural things, 
physical human products, abstract and fictitious beings 
such as, in order, cars, nation states and Sherlock Holmes, 
a memory and record of the past events and figures, names 
and categories of things, conceptual relations of things, 
negation and contradiction; on the other hand, on the earth, 
it is only ‘natural’ things like stones, plants and animals 
that exist.6  In other words, the world is where, in addition 
to artefacts, human conceptual commitments and inferential 
relations are already embedded.  Therefore, for example, 
in the world, there are situations describable in negative 
and even contradictory sentences; by contrast, there is no 
negation or contradiction on the earth.
Should we, then, dismiss the earth from our discussion 
as something intellectually unreachable like Kant’s ‘Ding-
an-sich’?  Certainly not.  The earth is the foundation 
for our embracing of realism.  It is true that we occupy a 
multitude of standpoints and thus each person lives in a 
more or less different world from that of others.  However, 
the difference does not amount to total incommunicability. 
Now we can ascribe our communicability between ‘different 
worlds’ to the existence of the earth, as it were.  It is nota-
ble that a parallel can be drawn between mind and body—
put precisely, between human qua human and human as 
purely physical.  Our bodies are biologically convergent in 
that, for instance, no one can be 3 meters tall, see 5 kilo-
meters ahead or live for 200 years.  Because of these kinds 
of biologically in-built constraints of our bodies and our 
conceptual capacities, we basically react to the earth in such 
a way that we can, in varying degrees, communicate with 
one another—even if people live in different cultures, using 
different languages.  Furthermore, the earth is the ground of 
human mistakes.  An aspect of the earth not yet disclosed 
may tell us that a human perspective that has been seen as 
right so far needs modifications.  Put the other way round, 
the earth is a source for the infinite but (at least in theory) 
communicable variety of human knowledge.
Yet, this distinction between world and earth must not be 
confused with the complete separateness of them.  They can 
be described distinctively only for expediency’s sake, but 
the fact is that they form a totality of human world from the 
outset. Such a human world exists prior to the existence of 
any single human being; no one can create the human world 
ex nihilo from the earth or from ‘the world as it really is’.
Noteworthy here is that it is, contrary to what John 
McDowell terms ‘bald naturalism’ (McDowell, 1996), 
impossible to try to inspect the earth by bracketing the 
notion of our (human) world.7   Along these lines, I would 
argue that truth can be understood as ‘truth humanly speak-
ing’, aware that this may have a somewhat feeble-minded 
constructivist connotation.  It neither follows, however, 
that truth is one-sidedly epistemic nor that ontology can be 
reducible to epistemology.  The point to appreciate is that 
we do not have to abandon the Enlightenment notions 
adduced earlier such as objective knowledge, absolute 
truth, etc.  Yet, these notions need to be recognised in the 
way just mentioned, rather than in the conservative way 
that Siegel favours.  What we must bear in mind is the fun-
damentally organic and inseparable relation between world 
and earth. To borrow Heidegger’s enigmatic words:
World and earth are essentially different from one 
another and yet are never separated. The world grounds 
itself on the earth, and earth juts through world. Yet the 
relation between world and earth does not wither away 
into the empty unity of opposites unconcerned with one 
another (Heidegger, 1993, p174, italics added).
This passage should, I think, be read as one that high-
lights the dynamic and shifting character of the unity 
between world and earth.
Siegel adheres to the binary oppositions between ratio-
nal justification as epistemic and truth as non-epistemic—
i.e. independent of humans—despite his ambivalent claim 
that they are nonetheless not irrelevant to each other.  As 
long as we oscillate between them, however, no one would 
be able to resolve the age-old difficulty of accounting 
convincingly for the relation between the non-epistemic 
character of truth and the human epistemic capacity of 
rational justification.  Siegel adverts to ‘an earlier Putnam’ 
as considering truth ‘radically nonepistemic’ (Siegel, 
1997, p216).  However, in my understanding, Putnam 
these days has an outlook quite congenial to the story 
I have been trying to articulate.  The difference between 
Siegel and myself therefore becomes clearer by shifting 
attention to Putnam’s views on the relevant issues.
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3. The interpenetration between mind, body and 
world: Hilary Putnam
The central gist of the present Putnam8 is, I argue, the 
insight that value judgements, descriptions of fact and 
human linguistic conventions are all interpenetrating.  In 
other words, mind, body and world are, from the very 
beginning, interpenetrating.  ‘An earlier Putnam’, with 
whom Siegel has an affinity concerning the concept of truth, 
embraced what Putnam now calls metaphysical realism—
a doctrine that ‘the mind and the world are separated by an 
epistemological chasm’ (Heil, 2005).  Clearly, the Carte-
sian mind-body dualism is one extreme form of metaphysi-
cal realism.  His gradual dissatisfaction with metaphysical 
realism drove Putnam 1 to the next stage, where he sees 
truth as ‘idealised rational acceptability’ rather than as 
‘radically nonepistemic’.  His further shift to the present 
Putnam is a promising extension of the previous line that 
placed slightly too much emphasis on the internalistic—i.e. 
subjectivist—explanation of truth.
Obviously, Siegel is averse to Putnam 2, the internal 
realist Putnam (Siegel, 1997, p216).  In line with Putnam 
1’s scheme, Siegel holds the following view as to critical 
thinking which he highly appreciates as ‘the educational 
cognate’ of rationality (Siegel, 1988, p127):
[T]ruth is independent of rational justification: we can 
be justified in believing that q even though q is false; 
and we can be justified in rejecting q as false even 
though it is true (Siegel, 1997, p18).
Based on this view, Siegel gives priority to rational 
justification rather than truth as the aim of critical thinking 
(Siegel, 1997, p34).9  The view cited above is in tandem 
with his understanding of ‘fallibilism’.  I concur with 
fallibilism inasmuch as the epistemological programme of 
foundationalism as it is cannot be tenable.10  I do not 
believe, however, that there could happen a total or massive 
failure in our recognition of truth, given that we live in our 
human world rather than a meaningless environment. 
Everything in the world is bound up in complex ways 
within a social, historical and relational matrix, a de facto 
reliance upon which cannot possibly be dropped out of 
view, as one thing implies and is imbricated with many 
others.  Nor can this complex interacting web be forgotten 
as a crucial condition of our ability to live in our world qua 
humans.  As mentioned, the earth is always a source for 
our mistakes, but the mistakes are revisions and modifica-
tions, not a massive failure which proves that our engaging 
in our world so far is completely misoriented.
I do not mean to say that Siegel’s fallibilism implies a 
massive or total failure.  But, what seems to be missing in 
his account of fallibilism is the acuteness towards the 
present Putnam’s subtler insight.  When Siegel says that 
we can be justified in believing that q even though q is 
false, how can we arrive at a conviction that q is in fact 
false despite our rational justification that q is right?  His 
answer is that:
Even very powerful reasons for or against some claim q 
can be wrong, misleading, or overturned by evidence not 
yet available (Siegel, 1997, p18, italics added).
This reply seems prima facie good enough and ideally 
scientific.  I am inclined to claim, however, that a sort of 
pitfall may lie here, a pitfall that might risk leading towards 
a species of scientism, which Siegel obviously rejects.
As referred to, Siegel thinks of critical thinking as the 
educational cognate of rationality and regards fostering 
critical thinking as one fundamental aim of education. 
Given that our world is already filled with a great deal of 
scientific, and correlatively technological, frameworks, it is 
inappropriate and simply wrong to devalue science.  Yet, I 
would take issue with Siegel if he is prone to confine the apex 
of rationality to science—i.e. the presently most dominant 
view—, which appears to be a covert aspiration shared by 
many ‘naturalistic’ analytical philosophers.  What he seems 
to be mistaken about is his likely assumption that evidence 
not yet available will (probably scientifically) be disclosed 
to us in a non-epistemic, namely, human-independent form. 
In brief, what Siegel fails to fully apprehend is that evidence 
not yet available will partly be a result of the way humans 
live—e.g. how we envisage a mode of enquiry.  The whole 
point is that it is us human beings that constitute the relevance 
of evidence. It is not a priori determined.11
It is here that the significance of education is brought 
into clear focus.  As noted, all that is given in our world has 
and involves a relation to human history and experience. 
Due to concrete social and historical determinations and 
determinacies, opacities of the interpenetration between 
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concept and being as well as between word and world are 
unavoidable.  Insofar as truth is only revealed through 
human experience and practice, education has vitally 
important roles to play in order to improve the breadth 
and depth of our experience as human beings collectively 
(which might be called the social dimension of education) 
as well as to become full and free human beings individu-
ally (which might be called the personal dimension of 
education).  Put another way, the two main broad roles of 
education I want to emphasise are: (i) to initiate people 
into the world of meaning constituted by the complex 
interaction and deeper imbrication between concept and 
being as well as between word and world, and thereby 
(ii) to lead them to increase the sophistication of their 
interrelatedness in better ways because the unity can shift. 
As long as ‘the world as it is’, whatever it may be, does 
not offer us a recipe for our living,12 let alone legitimate 
human development from outside our world, we human 
beings have the burden of making our ongoing world 
better and more sophisticated.  At the heart of these 
processes lies education—education in a broad sense. 
For, since we cannot get outside our world, what we can 
do is just to tinker with what is already here, so to speak, 
namely, with the legacy of human history which has 
been embodied and repositted in tradition and language. 
(Hans-Georg Gadamer and McDowell are the representative 
embodiments of this idea.) Viewed in this way, education 
in the inclusive sense described is the centrepiece of 
human development.
Put another way, the advancement of evidence not yet 
available, whether it is scientific or not, goes hand in hand 
with human rationality—a basic conceptual web which 
has been historically (and biologically) conditioned and 
the de facto reliance on which makes it possible for 
humans to live in our world.  In a nutshell, what will be 
unpacked by evidence not yet available does exist indepen-
dently of human epistemic capacities, but it will partly be 
concept-dependent, though not concept-exhaustive.13 
Thus, the main problem with Siegel’s account of the relation 
between rational justification and truth resides in the fact 
that he does not dismiss metaphysical realism—the view 
that ‘the things we talk and think about are whatever way 
they are independently of our thoughts’ (Cormier, 2006, 
p110)—by adhering to the idea that truth is ‘radically non-
epistemic’.14
With the aid of Heidegger’s distinction between world 
and earth as well as Putnam’s idea of the interpenetration 
of mind, body and world, I have striven to reveal that we 
can overcome an obsessing worry of philosophy, especial-
ly of Cartesian and British-empiricist epistemology, the 
worry about how the human mind can be in touch with the 
‘external’ world.  The fact is that they bleed non-reduc-
tively into as well as out of each other and thus that they 
figure as a complex and subtly nuanced totality.  In this, 
there is no room for either the proposition that Reality as 
it is totally independently of humanity on the one hand, or 
the thesis that the mind one-sidedly constitutes the world 
on the other.
The vital point is that considerations so far tell us that 
we can retain a sort of ‘representation’—accordingly, most 
of the Enlightenment notions listed earlier—even after we 
jettison the conventional correspondence theory of truth. 
Here, this representation, as Putnam puts it, is entailed by 
the activity ‘in which we engage’, not the idea of a represen-
tation as ‘an interface between ourselves and what we think 
about’ (Putnam, 1999, p59, italics in original).  The follow-
ing example Putnam adduces serves to encapsulate this 
point: ‘Wittgenstein says that “This chair is blue” (imagine 
he had a blue chair in front of him) corresponds to reality, 
but he can only say to what reality by using the sentence 
itself’ (Putnam, 1999, p197).  Put another way, the kind of 
representation we endorse is by nature normative, which is 
decisively distinct from non-normative ‘representation’ in 
the correspondence theory.  True, Siegel also stresses the 
normative character of rationality and its importance for 
education, but, as far as this matter is concerned, his under-
standing of normativity seems not to reach the point where 
the notion of ‘correspondence’ or ‘representation’ is already 
normative in the sense that such notions already possess 
human conceptual content.15
Siegel is right in locating rationality ‘between an overly 
formalistic conception of rationality, and an overly contex-
tualist conception’ (Siegel, 1997, p102, italics added); that 
is, ‘substantively’ (Siegel, 1997, p104).  Nonetheless, his 
position makes me somewhat uneasy about the way ratio-
nality is to be understood. For his mode of speaking might 
give the impression that rationality is, though normative and 
fallible, inert.  Still, rationality essentially requires open 
variety—on the basis of rationality we now have.  Human 
flourishing evolves, as does rationality—intertwined with 
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a refinement of normativity and justification.  That is, 
Siegel’s path still appears to run nearer the formalistic one. 
My lane, it could be argued, is slightly closer to the con-
textualist one, which results from my emphasis on what 
might be called the social and historical aspects of human 
knowledge that enable us to grasp the organic and plastic 
character of rationality.
4.  A small conclusion
In section 1, I wrote that part of recent philosophical 
scholarship shows a close alliance of philosophy with 
education.  This line of philosophical argument can be 
summarised as a growing awareness about what I would call 
the social and historical dimensions of human knowledge. 
The view is well explained, for instance, by Richard Rorty in 
his introduction to Wilfrid Sellars’s philosophy: ‘knowledge 
is inseparable from a social practice—the practice of justi-
fying one’s assertions to one’s fellow-humans.  It is not 
presupposed by this practice, but comes into being along 
with it’ (Rorty, 1997, italics added).16  Knowledge is never 
divorced from social practices of justification to fellow-
humans; but, it is by no means reduced to a determined set 
of social practices or conventions.  This goes precisely to 
the heart of my argument in this paper.  This view pursued 
here, if taken seriously, encourages us to see the traditional 
outlook towards the relationship between philosophy and 
education differently; that is, philosophy must in essence 
be seen to be interwoven with educational aspects.  Paul 
Standish convincingly adverts to this point:
[F]orms of enquiry central to philosophy (into ethics, 
epistemology and metaphysics) themselves necessarily 
incorporate questions about learning and teaching: they 
ask questions not only about the nature of the good (for 
the individual and for society), but also about how we 
become virtuous; and not only about the nature of 
knowledge, but also about how it is acquired.  In other 
words, these essentially educational questions of teach-
ing and learning are not external matters to which the 
philosophy is applied, but internal to philosophy itself 
(Standish, 2007, p162, italics in original).
This line of thinking reminds me of Quine’s favourite 
parable of Neurath’s boat: the ‘parable of the mariner who 
has to rebuild his boat while staying afloat in it’ (Quine, 
1988, italics added).  Quine appeals to this parable to stress 
that philosophy is part of science in the sense of no first 
philosophy outside of science.  In contrast, I make an 
appeal to this parable to amplify a non-foundational 
explanation of human knowledge on the grounds that we 
are always already in our world which co-varies with 
rationality, normativity and justification.
Siegel’s discourse seems to reiterate the trivial point that 
we live in the world filled with meanings where rationality 
and reasons are of primary importance inasmuch as it 
would not make any coherent sense to have meanings 
without them.  This point is certainly critical but neverthe-
less it does not go far enough.  To follow it through, it is to 
be recognised that we are always in some sense on the 
way—i.e. our world is shifting.  Due to Siegel’s insensibility 
towards this latter point, his understanding of human 
knowledge may arouse the impression that rationality and 
normativity, for instance, are of inert nature and according-
ly that his views on education based upon a traditional 
epistemology are also limited.
Assuming that our world is intrinsically normative, 
however, has yet to answer the more imperative question 
whether this has any implications for content, namely, how 
we should live or what education we should envisage. 
What I have attempted to do in this paper is just to prepare 
the ground for further fruitful discussion about this.
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Notes
1. What I mean by ‘Philosophy’, ‘academic philosophy’ 
and ‘general philosophy’ designates other philosophical 
areas—such as the philosophy of mind, language, 
science, etc.—most of which are distinct from the 
philosophy of education insofar as they are practiced 
and taught in Departments of Philosophy.  Note also 
that what I mean by ‘epistemology’ in this paper 
almost entirely coincides with the strand dominant in 
the Anglo-American analytical tradition.
2. The internalist and externalist conceptions of epistemic 
justification, reliabilism, virtue epistemology and 
many other theories typify this tendency.
3. These papers caused upheaval in the empiricist episte-
mological tradition of philosophy insofar as they 
putatively undermined traditional assumptions and 
formulations in the explanation of how we attain 
knowledge in philosophy: for example, the Kantian 
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements 
and the Platonic account of knowledge—justified true 
belief—were threatened.
4. Both pragmatism and the later Wittgenstein’s view 
deserve detailed attention inasmuch as they are anti-
Platonist to the effect that human knowledge is never 
legitimated from outside of the human cognitive 
domain.  However, these are too substantial to address 
here and would be the topic of a separate paper.
5. ‘It [the Rortian relativisation of knowledge] seems 
more widely accepted in education than it is within 
epistemology’ (Winch and Gingell, 2008, p75).
6. This description is, strictly, not accurate.  For on the 
earth, there is neither name nor any category for 
understanding, say, what a stone is.  By the same 
token, the earth is not even the mere collection of 
physical entities. For the idea of collection, for example, 
already presupposes something that does not exist 
anywhere in the meaningless environment.
7. Space does not permit me to do more than refer to some 
remarks made by philosophers who encourage this line 
of thinking.  Robert Brandom insists, inspired by Hegel, 
that ‘[t]he study of natures itself [e.g. physics] has a 
history, and its own nature, if any, must be approached 
through the study of that history’ (Brandom, 2000, 
p33); Putnam, elucidating the impossibility of science 
as purely naturalistic, argues that ‘[o]ur views on the 
nature of coherence and simplicity [which enable the 
conducting of science] are historically conditioned, 
just as our views on the nature of justice or goodness 
are’ (Putnam, 1990, p138).  It should not be assumed, 
however, that these philosophers sign up for a thorough-
going historicism.
8. There are at least three stages at which Putnam has 
deployed distinct views. Christopher Norris, calling 
the three Putnams ‘Putnam 1’, ‘Putnam 2’ and ‘Putnam 3’ 
respectively, describes Putnam 1 as a ‘strong causal-
realist’, Putnam 2 as an ‘internal realist’ and Putnam 3 
as a ‘commonsense’ realist (Norris, 2002, p25).  I feel 
friendly towards Putnam 3, while Siegel towards 
Putnam 1.
9. Siegel recently professes his modification of the earlier 
view concerning the importance of rational justifica-
tion and truth as aims of education.  His sustained 
discussion with Israel Scheffler and Alvin Goldman 
urges Siegel to come to see that ‘both true belief and 
rational belief (and, relatedly, critical thinking) are 
rightly regarded as crucial epistemic aims of educa-
tion’ (Siegel, 2005, p347).  However, the problem of 
how rational justification and truth are to be mediated 
has yet to be defused.  This is why the trouble, I 
think, still abides even in his present view.
10. I find unacceptable the sort of foundationalism defined 
as follows: ‘what all foundationalisms share in common 
is the belief that any adequate account of human 
knowledge must not only explain how our knowledge-
claims about “the world” can be justified beyond all 
doubt, but also how we arrived at such an account of 
justification itself’ (Wachterhauser, 2002).
11. Note that I am not claiming that how we live determines 
or changes the material structure of our world, needless 
to say.  Rather, the point I want to make here is that it is 
our ways of engaging with such a material structure that 
partly—if not entirely—determine which aspects of 
reality can be possible objects of our knowledge in our 
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world.  One corollary to this point is that the content of 
science and the method of science are not irrelevant to 
each other.  However, it is to be borne in mind that this 
view does not entail the repudiation of presently 
accepted scientific evidence.
12. Note, however, that ‘the world as it is’ provides some 
background conditions and constraints under which 
alone humans and all other living things can live.  For 
instance, no one, no animal and no plant can break 
natural laws like the law of gravity.  To use Heidegger’s 
terminology, the earth is required for the world to figure.
13. I take these terms, ‘concept-dependent’ and ‘concept-
exhaustive’, from Roy Bhaskar.
14. Siegel suggested to me that truth be seen as a semantic 
property.  To be sure, some of the claims I have made 
about truth might be more plausible as claims about 
meaning.  Either way, Siegel’s formulation that truth is 
radically non-epistemic seems to be untenable to the 
extent that it implies Reality or the Way the World is. 
However, this point needs further exploration.
15. What I have here in mind is McDowell’s insight that 
experiences and impressions—i.e. ‘impingements by 
the world on our sensibility’ (McDowell, 1996, p10)—
already have conceptual content.
16. As many critics argue, Rorty often goes too far.  We 
should not throw out the baby with bath water, however. 
His views are, on many occasions, insightful though 
he at times takes a further step, which is all too often 
both needless and bewildering.  The quote I cite here 
is incisive unless it is interpreted as a form of linguistic 
idealism or epistemic conventionalism.
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